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This paper makes a unique contribution to the South African literature in combining data 
from an alternative source of household survey data – the All Media and Product Survey 
(AMPS) – with national accounts income trends for this country, in the recent tradition of 
research  on  the  world  distribution  of  income  performed  by  Bhalla  (2002),  Karshenas 
(2003),  Bourguignon  and  Morrisson  (2002),  Sala-i-Martin  (2002a;  2002b),  and  Quah 
(2002), amongst others.  Its usefulness lies in arriving at alternative estimates of post-
transition poverty and inequality that are consistent with the story that national accounts 
and other official data collectively tell us about the path of the South African economy 
during the post-transition period.  While the method of scaling survey distribution data 
by  national  accounts  means  is  somewhat  controversial,  it  is  not  clear  that  the 
distributional  trends  obtained  using  the  post-transition  sets  of  either  the  IESs  or  the 
Population Censuses are more reliable, given serious deficiencies in both sources of data.  
Adjusted  distributions  yield  lower  levels  of  poverty  and  a  stronger  decline  in  poverty 
during the second half of the period than the figures obtained from the raw AMPS data.  
While the levels of poverty obtained using adjusted income distributions are artificially 
low, the derived downward trend is supported by a number of official data sources.  
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A SERIES OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS-CONSISTENT ESTIMATES 




In recent years, the usefulness of survey data for analysing income distributions has been increasingly 
vocally disputed.   In particular, the  discrepancy  between trends  in welfare derived from the  national 
accounts and those derived from household surveys is a primary factor fuelling the debate.  In 1987, 
survey mean income stood at 65.1% of national accounts GDP per capita for developing countries as a 
whole; by 1998, this proportion had fallen to 54.4% (Bhalla 2002: 109).  In South Africa, the inconsistency 
is more fundamental: some of the trends in the income distributions constructed from official household 
surveys over the latter half of the 1990s are entirely incompatible with trends in the national accounts 
concept of household income over the same period.  For instance, Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary 
(2005) found evidence of a 40% decline in individual per capita incomes between 1995 and 2000, after 
analysing the Income and Expenditure Surveys (IESs) collected in these years.  By contrast, calculations 
based on the national accounts data show that household income growth was positive throughout this 
period, with no single year recording an increase measuring less than 2%3.  
 
This  paper  makes  a  unique  contribution  to  the  South  African  literature  in  combining  data  from  an 
alternative source of household survey data – the All Media and Product Survey (AMPS) – with national 
accounts income trends for this country, in the recent tradition of research on the world distribution of 
income performed by Bhalla (2002), Karshenas (2003), Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), Sala-i-Martin 
(2002a; 2002b), and Quah (2002), amongst others.  Its usefulness lies in arriving at alternative estimates of 
post-transition poverty and inequality that are consistent with the story that national accounts and other 
official data collectively tell us about the path of the South African economy during the post-transition 
period.   Since  AMPS data are available  annually, it  is possible to  extend  analysis following  a  similar 
methodology employed by Van der Berg and Louw (2004) and Van der Berg, Burger, Burger, Louw and 
Yu (2005).  The paper begins with a discussion on the use of national accounts data to adjust survey-based 
income distributions, including an overview of motivations for adopting this technique and some of its 
major criticisms. Next, an outline of the adjustment methodology applied to AMPS data is provided, 
together with descriptive analysis relating to trends in household income during the post-transition period.  
This  provides  the  foundation  for  presentation  of  adjusted  AMPS-based  estimates  of  poverty  and 
inequality.  The paper closes with a summary and policy conclusions.  
 
                                                      
3 This calculation is based on the recently discontinued SARB current income (6244L) series. 4 
2.  WHY  SCALE  HOUSEHOLD  SURVEY-BASED  INCOME  DISTRIBUTIONS  BY 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA? 
 
The  large  and  growing  disparity  between  average  living  standards  measured  on  the  basis  of  national 
accounts data and households surveys, highlighted above, has raised concern amongst analysts the world 
over.  A solution first adopted by the Indian government involves replacing household survey means with 
national accounts means, while retaining the distribution of welfare yielded by household surveys.  While 
the government of India abandoned use of this technique in 1993 (allegedly due to concerns regarding the 
quality of their national accounts data – Deaton 2005: 17), it has subsequently routinely been used on 
Latin American data, where survey distributions have been scaled by individual components of household 
income (see for instance Szekely and Hilgert 1999).  Furthermore, in more recent years the methodology 
has found wider application, with a number of authors – including Sala-i-Martin, Quah, Bourguignon and 
Morrison – employing it to investigate topics concerning world poverty.  This extension has drawn fresh 
criticism, and a re-examination of the merits of the approach.  Accordingly, a review of the case for 
national accounts adjustment in the South African scenario is provided next, as well as a discussion on the 
theoretical benefits and costs accompanying the adoption of this technique. 
 
Delving into the South African data, a comparison of household income captured by national accounts 
data  and  aggregate  household  income  derived  from  two  sets  of  data  sources  yields  two  important 
conclusions.  Table 1 below shows the ratio of national accounts current income to estimates of aggregate 
household income from the IESs of 1995 and 2000 and annual AMPS surveys.      
 
Firstly, the ratio of survey to national accounts income is often highly variable.  For instance, the official 
data sources - namely the October Household Survey (OHS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) - capture 
more than 100% of national accounts remuneration income in 1995, but less than 70% in 2004.  Given a 
steady and relatively stable upward trend in national accounts income – in line with economic growth 
trends in South Africa, questions regarding the reliability of trends drawn from official survey income 
aggregates arise.  One may also be concerned over the substantially smaller estimate of household income 
drawn from surveys for most of the period.  Analysing the issue from the household expenditure4 side, 
Deaton (2005: 4) notes that surveys only capture three quarters of national accounts totals in the OECD – 
the group of countries for which one would expect data quality to be highest.  Secondly, the proportion of 
national accounts income captured by official surveys seems to be falling over time. In contrast, the 
AMPS  estimates  of  household  income  seem  to  be  roughly  stable  over  time,  in  relation  to  national 
accounts.  AMPS data may also be considered more reliable if one applies Deaton’s (2005: 4) argument 
that the standard deviation of the ratio between survey and national accounts income provides a measure 
of the accuracy of a data source.  
                                                      
4 Expenditure captured in surveys is typically smaller than income, although theoretically they should be equal if 
saving is included in the definition of expenditure.   
 
Table 1: Proportion of national accounts income captured by various household surveys, 1993-2004
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Standard 
deviation
National accounts current income (Rmill) 313 763 352 213 402 256 452 785 508 851 555 002 607 591 677 570 737 206 825 109 898 558 989 290
IES 96% 62%
AMPS 66% 62% 60% 60% 57% 59% 56% 60% 59% 58% 60% 57% 2.9%Which factors are responsible for the observed disparities between estimates of household income drawn 
from surveys and national accounts data?  The most obvious point relates to the different coverage and 
accounting practices adopted in constructing the two data sources.  Surveys often exclude students and 
some  institutions  (including  hostels),  whereas  national  accounts  theoretically  account  for  the  whole 
population.  Unlike the measure of household income captured in surveys, the concept of household 
income in the national accounts includes income accruing to non-incorporated business enterprises as well 
as  non-governmental  non-profit  organisations  (NGOs)  that  render  social  and  community services  to 
households.  Some authors argue that growth in the NGO sector – which could be particularly rapid in 
developing countries due to a changing production structure – may be driving the increasing gap between 
national accounts and survey income aggregates (Ravallion 2000).  However, Bhalla (2002: 108) points out 
that this is not likely to be the case.   
 
Even if the accounting unit were the same – namely the household – the definition of household income 
would remain different across data sources. Current income in the national accounts includes both income 
in kind and imputed rents accruing to households, while the measure of household income collected by 
household  surveys  often  excludes  or  poorly  captures  these  items.    Commenting  on  the  discrepancy 
between national accounts and survey estimates of expenditure, Deaton (2005: 10) remarks: “there are 
conceptual  differences between  the  two concepts of consumption, but these do not  account for the 
differences in growth rates, so that one or both of the growth rates are incorrect”.   
 
A factor that drives level differences between national accounts and survey measures of income, but not 
necessarily  the  growing  gap  between  them  associated  with  economic  growth,  is  measurement  and 
sampling error.  Household surveys often suffer from incompleteness, inter alia as a result of household 
non-compliance and item non-response. It is well known that more affluent households are both less 
likely to participate in surveys and more likely to underreport income when they do comply (Ravallion 
2000; Bhalla 2002; Korinek et al. 2005). Banerjee and Piketty (2003: 2) estimate that 20-40% of the gap 
between  survey  and  national  accounts  based  estimates  of  growth  is  due  to  undercounting  the  very 
affluent.   Further,  household  survey  data  for  16 Latin  American  countries reveal  that  the  10  richest 
households  participating  in  household  surveys  in  each  country  in  most  cases  reported  total  incomes 
merely equivalent to the typical salary earned by a manager of a medium to large sized firm in the region 
(Szekely & Hilgert 1999: 13).  Surveys may also incorrectly reflect the population income distribution as a 
result of flaws in the sampling design: the IES2000 provides a recent South African example in this regard.  
In addition, they may be less representative of households in remote rural or dangerous areas, as a result 
of obstacles to fieldwork (Deaton 2005: 15).   
 
National  accounts  data  similarly  suffer  from  a  range  of  defects.    Since  the  household  income  and 
expenditure series are typically constructed using survey data, and extrapolated with the aid of other data 7 
for  time  periods  in  which  no  survey  data  are  available,  the  quality  of  national  accounts  data  varies 
according to whether the year in question is a benchmark year (i.e. a year for which survey data are 
available).  In South Africa, the benchmarks for national accounts series relating to household income are 
changed at approximately five-year intervals.  A related issue is population weighting: ratios are applied to 
survey  data  to  achieve  representivity  with  respect  to  the  population.    These  ratios  are  generally 
infrequently revised, and may lead to incorrect estimates if a population is dynamic.  Deaton (2005: 15) 
argues that the use of outdated ratios and correction factors is especially deleterious when economies are 
developing, given the associated changes in their production structures.  Finally, national accounts series 
may be revised frequently; in South Africa, revisions to household income series were recently undertaken 
in accordance with the IES2000, resulting in real household expenditure growth rising from an average of 
2.6% per annum over 1998-2003, to 2.9% (Mantshimuli 2004: 65. Van Walbeek (2006) provides more 
detail on South African national accounts revisions.)  Bhalla (2002) argues that errors in national accounts 
data series are more likely to cancel out than those in surveys, as a result of the series being compiled from 
a range of sources and being subject to cross-checking.   
 
Thirdly, it is likely that the ability of the national accounts to capture income increases as economies 
develop.  In contrast to the two points discussed above, this one directly affects the size of the gap 
between proportions of household income captured by the different data sources.  The value of informal 
sector activity is notoriously difficult to measure, and can be sizeable in a developing country context.  As 
economies grow and their structures change, many production activities shift from households to the 
formal sector, as a result of the “increasing marketization, complexity, and roundaboutness of production 
with economic development” (Deaton 2005: 15). Consequently, economic activity may be increasingly 
accurately picked up in national accounts data.  This implies that in developing countries, the level of 
national accounts income is understated while growth is overstated.  To some extent this phenomenon 
may  explain  the  apparently  widening  gap  between  national  accounts  and  official  survey  estimates  of 
household income and wages in South Africa during the first post-transition decade: a period of moderate 
but robust economic growth.  However, empirical international research does not support the existence of 
such a bias during economic expansion5 (Ravallion 2003: 649).  Deaton (2005: 3) is critical of this result, 
attributing it to large variation across countries in the ratio of survey to national accounts totals. 
 
Despite the shortcomings inherent in national accounts data series, there is practical value to be derived 
from  adjusting  income  distributions  drawn  from  household  surveys  with  national  accounts  data  for 
purposes of trend analysis.  In addition, the adjusted distributions can be used for time series analysis of 
macroeconomic  data  (for  instance,  investigating  the  impact  of  economic  growth  on  poverty  and 
inequality).  Several recent distribution studies have yielded results quite at odds with the national accounts 
and  other  clues  to  the  state  of  the  South  African  economy,  partly  as  a  result  of  relying  on  official 
                                                      
5 However, Ravallion (2003) does note a large discrepancy between national accounts and survey estimates of growth 
during times of economic contraction. 8 
household survey data that may not be suitable for purposes of comparative analysis. The Leibbrandt et al. 
(2005) findings provide an example in this regard.  The magnitude of the decline recorded based on the 
two IESs implies a greater fall in output than the one that occurred during the Great Depression, and is at 
odds with a number of economic indicators relating to the period.  Indeed, it is argued here that the 
existing post-transition South African official household surveys are plagued by serious deficiencies that 
render them unsuitable for trend analysis (see section 4).  While the quality of national accounts data is 
called into question in some developing countries (for example India), the evidence below suggests that in 
South Africa the quality of survey data is a cause for greater concern.    
 
Firstly, one might expect a sharp decline in income to lead to a comparable fall in petrol sales.  However, 
sales of petroleum products increased 9.0% over the period 1995-2000, petrol by 2.4%, and paraffin by 
0.8% (SAPIA); note that the low growth in paraffin sales may have been a result of growing access to 
electricity.    Another  indicator  of  economic  activity,  electricity  produced,  increased  by  12.9%  while 
electricity consumed rose by 15.0%, the difference being accounted for by electricity imports (StatsSA(a)).  
The volume of goods transported, mainly by road, increased by 12.2% (StatsSA(b)).  Audited national 
revenue figures also provide a real and strong contradiction of the survey trends.  Instead of strongly 
declining, as one would expect in response to a sharp decline in incomes of the magnitude implied by the 
two IES surveys, overall tax revenue increased 23.9%, largely driven by strong increases in VAT revenues 
(18.9%), income tax revenues (26.0%) and company tax revenue (32.6%) (SARB).  Such revenue increased 
despite the fact that VAT rates remained unchanged, and that both income tax and company tax rates 
were  adjusted  downwards  during  the  period.  Improved  tax  administration  is  acknowledged  to  have 
contributed to this rise, but some economists believe GDP growth is under- rather than over-estimated, 
judged inter alia by the buoyancy of tax revenues.   
 
Data  from surveys  on  economic activity  conducted  by Statistics South Africa  that feed  into  national 
accounts data series indicate that many of the components of aggregate production and expenditure have 
grown  substantially  over  the  period  1995-2000.    Retail  and  wholesale  sales  grew  by  9.9%  and  4.8% 
respectively, while there were also increases in expenditure on non-durables (4.8%), semi-durables (33.9%) 
and durables (8.4%).  In fact, the only two items that experienced negative growth were car sales (value of 
vehicles sold declined by 8.5%) and buildings completed (value down 11.2%), both of which are strongly 
cyclical types of expenditure (own calculations using Statistics South Africa 2004).  Taken together, this is 
fairly compelling evidence that average incomes over 1995-2000 did not follow the negative direction 
suggested by research comparing distributions drawn from the IES. 
 
In a similar vein, Bhalla (2002: 115-116) demonstrated that national accounts estimates of growth in living 
standards in India are closer than households survey growth estimates to the improvement suggested by 
the estimated changing price and income elasticities of staple food items.  His argument for continuing to 9 
adjust survey means with national accounts data is succinctly summarised as follows:  
 
“The World Bank’s reason for not adjusting survey means with national accounts means is that the latter are 
plagued with measurement problems.  Which is true.  However, the choice of which estimate is finally chosen should 
be decided according to which method minimizes errors, especially errors in trends, because that is an important 
variable of interest.  And it is likely that not adjusting survey means introduces a larger error into the trends than 
adjusting the survey means by national accounts data.”  
 
Bhalla (2002: 126) 
 
3.  WHAT  DOES  THE  LITERATURE  SAY  ABOUT  SCALING  HOUSEHOLD  SURVEY 
MEANS WITH NATIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA? 
 
A number of authors have raised criticisms of the national accounts adjustment methodology.  Three 
major  attacks  are  discussed  here.    The  first  argument  is  that  there  should  be  no  presumption  that 
economic growth is shared equally – or anything close to it – by the population of a country, assuming 
that  estimates  of  growth derived  from  the  national accounts  are reliable.   For instance, in  India the 
national accounts paint a picture of strongly rising consumption mobility during the 1990s, on the back of 
robust economic growth.  However, household surveys yield a less rosy outlook, particularly in terms of 
the reduction in poverty realised over the period (Deaton & Kozel 2005: 179).  Deaton (2005: 17) argues 
that given the differences in coverage and definition across the two data sources, it is possible for the 
incomes of the poor (captured in surveys) to increase by less than the national accounts growth rate 
without any increase in aggregate inequality, as estimated from survey data.  Indeed, in a very unequal 
society  such  as  South  Africa’s,  widespread  economic  exclusion  may  seriously  inhibit  the  poor  from 
improving their welfare in any significant way during booms.  However, this paper will argue that the 
rapid expansion of the social grant system in South Africa during the first few years of the twenty first 
century weakens this argument for at least the latter half of the period under study.    
 
The second argument relates to the consistency with which data sources are used and applied in economic 
analysis.  In this regard, Milanovic (2002) is sceptical of using national accounts data for the mean while 
retaining use of survey data for the distribution of income, arguing that the use of two fundamentally 
different data sources interferes with “internal consistency”.  Problems may also arise from working with 
two different measures of income, given the differences in coverage and accounting described above.  In 
particular,  NGOs  may  account  for  a  relatively  large  chunk  of  income  or  expenditure  in  developing 
countries, particularly those that are heavily reliant on donor aid.  As a middle-income country, however, 
South Africa is not aid-dependent.  In general, Ravallion (2000) believes the disparities to be glaring 
enough to make national accounts and survey measures of household income fundamentally incompatible.  
Deaton  (2005: 17)  makes a  similar  argument, pointing  out  that  “national  accounts track  money,  not 10 
people”.  Bourguignon (2005) does not support the survey purist argument as strongly.  He argues that the 
adjustment to the national accounts mean is only valid if the error captured by household surveys (that is, 
the random component picked up in addition to the true mean) is unrelated to the true level of welfare 
(income) across the entire income distribution. If there is a higher degree of misreporting in the upper tail 
of the income distribution (as is hypothesized), this assumption is violated.  However, if the correlation 
between the survey error and level of income over the range of the income distribution is small, the 
adjustment may be justified.  Nonetheless, to allow for the potential introduction of inconsistency, this 
paper  presents  unadjusted  estimates  of  poverty  for  South  African  as  an  alternative  to  the  adjusted 
estimates, noting that our conclusions remain largely unchanged.   
 
The third argument centres on the way in which survey income distributions are typically adjusted using 
national accounts data – that is, neutrally.  Adjusting survey data with national accounts data involves 
making two assumptions, one across space and another across time.   
 
Firstly, one typically assumes that the under- or over-estimation of household welfare in surveys is equi-
proportional to reported income over the entire range of the income distribution, regardless of potentially 
relevant factors including geographical location.  However, we know that undercapturing of income is 
often greatest at the upper end of the income distribution, due to underreporting by the rich to avoid tax-
related consequences or their reluctance to participate in surveys.  This appears to be a particularly severe 
problem  in  highly  unequal  countries,  such  as  South  Africa  (Deaton  2005:  11).    Given  the  large 
contribution that rich households make towards aggregate income, this implies that adjusting incomes 
upwards uniformly (that is, by a constant proportion) could result in great under-estimation of poverty.  
 
Korinek, Mistiaen and Ravallion (2005) explore the distributional consequences of correcting for survey 
non-compliance using US data (the Current Population Survey).  They find that household compliance 
(i.e. participation in surveys, which need not imply full reporting of income) falls monotonically as income 
rises, as one might expect.  Interestingly, the U.S. Census Bureau’s correction for this non-response is 
almost distribution-neutral; income at any percentile is increased by approximately 20% (Korinek et al. 
2005: 19).  This accords with Bhalla’s (2002: 117) research on Indian data; he argues that “a “constant” 
multiplier is not only plausible but also likely”.  The reason advanced for this is that the poor tend to be 
more likely to underreport food expenditure, while the rich tend to underreport non-food expenditure 
more; these forms of underreporting appear to balance each other out in proportional terms (Bhalla 2002: 
117).  While Korinek et al. (2005) find that correcting for non-response results in mean income and 
inequality rising substantially, the adjustment has little effect on poverty incidence for a broad range of 
poverty lines6.  In the analysis contained in this paper, racial distributions are scaled up separately and by 
different magnitudes.  Consequently, both the shape of the aggregate income distribution and its mean are 
                                                      
6 In fact, the authors find that the U.S. poverty rate tends to be over-estimated in general, as a result of higher survey 
compliance by less affluent households (Korinek et al. 2005: 19). 11 
affected by the adjustment.   
 
Secondly, the application of national accounts adjustment incorporates an assumption that underreporting 
of income increases uniformly (in proportional terms) across the population as the economy grows.  This 
is not valid if changes in household behaviour associated with economic growth and development form 
the driving force behind increasing under-reporting of income in household surveys, as Milanovic (2002) 
suggests might be the case.  For instance, non-compliance with surveys might rise with an overall increase 
in income levels.  Similarly, rising geographic inequality associated with economic growth – as observed in 
India  –  would  tend to  lower  the  ratio  of survey  to national  accounts  income  or  expenditure  means 
(Deaton 2005: 12-13).  However, this effect may be offset by an improvement in the ability of surveys to 
capture income accruing to the poor as production activities move to the formal sector. 
 
Given the potential difficulties associated with time and space in the undercapturing of income in surveys, 
Milanovic (2002) suggests that if analysts identify a need to correct survey data, the resulting adjustment 
should not be uniform.  However, the discussion above has highlighted at least two cases for which a 
careful tailored adjustment of incomes across the range of the distribution has resulted in an almost 
distribution-neutral correction for survey non-compliance, namely the USA and India.  Bhalla (2002: 120) 
argues that it can generally be assumed that approximately 10% of national accounts expenditure is not 
captured by household surveys as a result of non-compliance, equivalent to the median consumption 
shares of the wealthiest 2% of the average developing country population.  This proportion may be 
subtracted from national accounts estimates of household expenditure (or analogously income) before 
adjustment is applied, if there are concerns for poverty analysis flowing from raising incomes of the poor 
by too great a factor.  Alternatively, one may inflate the poverty line to reflect the incomes of the non-rich 
potentially being raised artificially much (Bhalla 2002: 120).  The same remedy may be applied in cases 
where compliant affluent households underreport income by a greater proportion than the rest of the 
population;  in  the  Indian  case,  the  wealthier  half  of  the  population  understates  expenditure  by  an 
estimated 3.5% more than the poorer half of the population (Bhalla 2002: 120-121).   
 
In this paper, stochastic dominance testing is applied to show that broad conclusions regarding poverty 
trends since 1994 are robust to the application of a range of plausible poverty lines.  While the levels of 
poverty differ substantially depending on which poverty line is selected, the trends remain the same.  This is 
a very important point, since the choice of poverty line is generally considered to be intrinsically a fairly 
arbitrary one.  With respect to the criticism of neutral adjustment across time, at least for AMPS-based 
analysis – such as the research contained in this paper – this does not appear to be applicable, given the 
broadly consistent capturing of income demonstrated by the survey.  To conclude this section, it is helpful 
to  remember  Deaton’s  (2005:  17)  general  criticism  of  welfare  data,  namely  that  neither  means  nor 
distributions  are  measured  perfectly  in  either  household  surveys  or  the  national  accounts.    The 12 
contribution of this paper is to attempt to reconcile the two sources in a way that sheds more light on 
poverty trends than what is available on the basis of survey data alone. 
 
4.  SOUTH AFRICAN INCOME DATA SOURCES: 1993-2004 
 
There are a number of post-transition household surveys on which researchers analysing trends in poverty 
and inequality may draw.  The two most prolifically used sets are the IESs of 1995 and 2000 (linked to the 
OHS  and  LFS respectively)  and the Population Censuses of 1996 and 2001.    The  Censuses  contain 
personal and household income, reported in a relatively small number of intervals (14 in 1996 and 12 in 
2001).  A greater problem stems from the fact that they contain a large – and apparently increasing – 
number of “zero-income” households: 12.6% in 1996 and 23.2% in 2001 (Simkins 2004: 6).  Since it is 
impossible for households to subsist without any form of income, this is a serious form of misreporting.  
The problem is no lesser for personal income data from the Censuses: in 1996, 11.8% of households 
returned missing values for the incomes of one or more members (Simkins 2004: 6), while in 2001 more 
than a quarter of individuals lived in households where some of the individuals had missing income data 
(Ardington et al. 2005: 7).    
 
The IESs provide an alternative to the Censuses, and include extensive information on both income and 
expenditure, some of which is available in point estimate form.  However, these surveys have been beset 
by problems prejudicing their comparability: Statistics South Africa recently admitted that data from the 
1995 and 2000 takes cannot reliably be used to derive trends in income.  If Census 2001 is used as a 
yardstick,  the  IES2000  under-represents  the  white  population  while  over-representing  the  black 
population (Hoogeveen & Özler 2004: 41).  This is reflected in IES2000 property income estimates that 
appear too low to be reliable (Simkins 2004: 4); however, the opposite is true in 1995.  Indeed, the 
consistency with which the IES captures the various components of household income seems to be highly 
variable.  This is further reflected in tax data; in 1995 the IES captured 97% of the personal income tax 
aggregate reported by SARS, while in 2000 it captured a mere 42% (own calculations using National 
Treasury).  Figure 1 expresses the components of household income captured by the two IES surveys as 
proportions of the comparable national accounts data series.  13 
 
Further, data management seems to have been worse in IES2000 than in the previous round: the number 
of zero responses for food expenditure is substantially higher in the later survey, and there are more cases 
of large gaps between household income and expenditure7.  The implications of these deficiencies for 
distributional analysis are revealed in Figure 2 below, where the two cumulative distribution functions for 
log per capita household incomes from the two IESs are plotted together.  The vertical line represents a 
poverty line of R3000 per capita per annum in 2000 values (this poverty line is used again in later analysis).  
Observe the implausibly sharp rise in poverty between 1995 and 2000 yielded by a comparison of the 
income distributions generated from the two IESs8.  
 
Fig 2: Cumulative distribution functions, IES1995 and IES2000 
 
                                                      
7 These variables are designed to be of equivalent size in the IES. 
8 Some analysts, including Hoogeveen and Özler (2004; 2006) have preferred to work with IES expenditures rather 
than incomes.  Using this measure of welfare does not change the direction or magnitude of the trend in poverty 
over 1995-2000. 
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Given the shortcomings associated with both of these data sources and the need for more recent data, this 
paper utilises a third, non-official data source – the AMPS.  This is a household survey run by the South 
African Advertising Research Foundation, for which income data are available annually for the entire 
period under study.  Comprehensive information regarding the survey is available in Van der Berg et al. 
(2007). 
 
Finally, a note on the South African national accounts data series used in this paper is in order.  The 
current income series collected by the SARB until very recently is the sum of compensation of employees, 
property income, and transfers from government, incorporated firms and the rest of the world received by 
private households, NGOs and non-incorporated firms9.  In proportional terms, transfers from business 
and the rest of the world are very small.  The discussion below thus focuses on the remaining three 
components of the current income series.   
 
The compensation of employees series is compiled using StatsSA’s Quarterly Employment Survey (the 
QES  excludes  the  agricultural  sector),  estimates  of  wages  in  the  agricultural  sector  provided  by  the 
Department of Agriculture, data from two surveys run by SARB (but not published) on the financial 
sector and on large and medium firms, and estimates of informal sector wages calculated by StatsSA on 
the basis of the LFSs.  Up until June 2005 the Survey of Employment and Earnings (SEE) provided the 
official basis of the series, and the SARB makes an attempt to reconcile the more recent wage data from 
the  QES  with  the  data  collected  using  the  SEE.    Given  the  variety  of  data  sources  available, some 
                                                      
9 The SARB has recently begun to compile South African national accounts in line with internationally standardised 
national accounting definitions, and the current income series has fallen away during this change. 15 
crosschecking can be done by the SARB to ensure that the series is relatively consistent and reliable.  
However, there are quality concerns regarding these data sources, particularly with respect to the QES. 
 
Property income consists of dividends received, net interest received, rent income (net of maintenance 
costs), mortgage interest, consumption of fixed capital, and the profits of non-incorporated firms.  The 
series is compiled using StatsSA’s Economic Activity Survey (which excludes the financial sector) and a 
variety of SARB data sources relating to banking and insurance.  The banks are required by law to disclose 
a range of information on their assets and liabilities, which enables SARB to gain a good idea of the 
property owned by bank clients and income accruing to these assets.  More difficult to track is property 
income accruing to assets employed in the informal sector and those owned by unbanked individuals and 
small business enterprises. For the purposes of this paper, transfers to households from business and the 
rest of the world are added to property income, collectively forming the residual category.   
 
Government transfers involve the payment of social grants, data for which are sourced by the SARB from 
the Department of Social Development.   
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5.  NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS-CONSISTENT  ESTIMATES  OF  POVERTY  AND 
INEQUALITY FOR SOUTH AFRICA: 1993-2004 
 
5.1  METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology followed in this paper for scaling survey means with national accounts data is described 
more fully in Van der Berg et al. (2005).  It has remained largely the same, with the exception of small 
improvements in the technique used to estimate the distribution of wage income.  A brief explanation of 
the methodology follows below. 
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  current  income  comprises  a  number  of  components.    Two  interesting  trends 
amongst these emerge over the past decade.  The first is a surprisingly large rise in the contribution of 
property  income  to  current  income,  suggesting  that  the  rich  have  benefited  disproportionately  from 
economic growth since 1994.  In South Africa, wealth is far less equally distributed than income is, and 
there is a stronger racial bias in its distribution.  The second trend is a dramatic increase in government 
transfers  from  2002  onwards,  contributing  towards  faster  growth  in  aggregate  income.    This  is 
predominantly the result of the extension of the child support grant (CSG) to children up to the age of 14, 
although the increase in the number of people taking up the disability grant – a much larger grant but with 
far less beneficiaries than the CSG – is also a significant contributor.  Any expansion of the social grant 
system disproportionately benefits the poor, given the application of a means test to potential social grant 
recipients.  Consequently, trends in current income suggest a widening of income inequality over the first 
post-transition decade, accompanied by a reduction in poverty since 2002 that should also have dampened 
the recent rise in inequality to some extent.  
 
Having  noted  trends  in  current  income,  the  next  step  involved  arriving  at  a  distribution  of  the 
components  of  current  income  for  each  race group.   The  distributions  of  individual components of 
current income across the population were estimated by race group, using a variety of survey data sources.  
Once the survey-based distributions of each component of current income had been obtained, each one 
was adjusted in line with the relevant national accounts mean.  To scale wage income in accordance with 
national  accounts  data,  employee  remuneration was  divided  by  racial  employment  estimates obtained 
using the Standardised Employment Series (which ended in 1996), the OHS (which ended in 1999) and 
the LFS (2000-2004).  Figure 3 below shows trends in the racial shares of income from main job earned in 
the formal sector, sourced from the OHS and LFS series.  Note the steadily increasing black share of 
remuneration, which comes predominantly at the expense of the shrinking white share.  The coloured and 
Indian shares of remuneration remained roughly constant over the period. 
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Arriving at a national-accounts consistent distribution of transfer income required delving into a number 
of data sources.  Under apartheid, the racial distribution of grant payments was available, so this data was 
utilised for estimating the racial share of transfer income during the early 1990s.  Previous fiscal incidence 
research by Van der Berg (2001) provided the racial shares of transfer income for 1993, 1995 and 1997, 
while  similar  more  recently  conducted  research  by  the  same  author  –  based  in  large  part  on  the 
IES/OHS1995 and IES/LFS2000 – provided comparable information for 1995 and 2000 (Van der Berg 
2005).  The General Household Surveys (GHS) collected in 2002, 2003 and 2004 comprised another 
source of data.  Estimates of actual grant income received by each race group were obtained by applying 
the racial shares of social grants obtained from each GHS to public expenditure on grants obtained from 
the 2005 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review.  For the years where no direct data source was available, shares 
were interpolated.   
 
Property income is mainly comprised of income earned from assets and business profits.  Since the asset 
(i.e. wealth) distribution is more highly skewed than the income distribution, and assets are accumulated 
slowly, income flows from assets are slow to change.  Given the scanty data on property income, a 
simplifying assumption is made, namely that the black share of property income grew slowly over the 
period, increasing by 0.5 percentage points annually from a very low base. This is roughly half the annual 
increment in the black share of the population in the higher income categories, thus it appears not to be 
an excessive assumption. Alternative assumptions have little effect on the final distribution and poverty 
results. 
 
Once the various components of current income had been distributed across race groups, it was possible 




















































































Black Coloured Indian White18 
to extract trends in per capita incomes by race.  Figure 4 below shows trends by race group during the 
post-transition period.  Note the upward trend for members of all race groups; in fact, black incomes grew 
faster than white incomes, although this is somewhat obscured by the very different bases off which 
growth occurred for the two race groups.  Coupled with more rapid population growth amongst blacks 
than whites, this is reflected in an increasing share of current income accruing to blacks: an estimated 
39.1% in 2004 versus 31.5% in 1993. These inter-racial distribution figures are not all that dissimilar from 
those obtained from AMPS itself, although AMPS shows a slightly more rapid rise in the black share of 
aggregate income than these estimates do. 
 
 
In order to be able to conduct income distribution analysis, it was necessary to combine data for intra-
group  distributions  of  income  with  the  national  accounts-based  data  for  inter-group  distributions  of 
income.  AMPS datasets were employed for this purpose.  Once racial distributions had been obtained 
using the AMPS data, the per capita survey means for each race group were adjusted in line with inter-
racial per capita means obtained as described above.   
 
5.2  ANALYSING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
 
Once annual income distributions for 1993-2004 consistent with national accounts data were derived as 
described above, it became possible to apply standard measures of poverty and inequality.  One major 
purpose of the paper is to establish with as much confidence as possible whether poverty has declined 
since political transition, so most of the attention focuses on measurement of trends in poverty rather 



































All Black Coloured Indian  White19 
than inequality.  The poverty line selected for analysis is R250 monthly per capita household income in 
2000 value, or R3 000 per annum.  This is higher than the $2 a day line, which converts into R174 per 
month in 2000 rand, and thus includes both severe and more moderate poverty.  However, it is lower than 
the cost-of-basic-needs measure employed by Hoogeveen and Özler (2006).  It is also consistent with 
earlier distributional analysis in Van der Berg and Louw (2004), Van der Berg et al. (2005) and Van der 
Berg et al. (2007).  To some extent the selection of a poverty line is arbitrary by its very nature; accordingly 
the  findings  in  this  paper  are  subjected  to  robustness  testing  through  the  estimation  of  cumulative 
distribution functions.   
 
The standard Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) measures of poverty provide the cornerstone for poverty 
analysis in this paper.  The poverty headcount (P0) reflects the extent of poverty; the poverty gap index 
(P1) reflects the depth of poverty; and the squared poverty gap index (P2) reflects the severity of poverty.  
In the case of P0, two figures are presented: the headcount rate (percentage of the population falling below 
the poverty line) and the headcount itself (the number of people falling below the poverty line).  Table 2 
below presents each of these measures of poverty for 1993, 1995, 2000 and 2004.  Estimates of FGT 
measures for each year from 1993 to 2004 are presented in the appendix. 
 
 
The best-known FGT measure – namely the headcount – reflects a moderate rise in poverty between 
Table 2: Poverty trends, 1993-2004
Group FGT 1993 1995 2000 2004
P0 headcount rate 33.6% 33.2% 36.4% 28.1%
P0 headcount 13 426 144 13 724 926 16 287 231 13 063 241
P1 0.1491 0.1493 0.1631 0.1128
P2 0.0879 0.0889 0.0946 0.0612
P0 headcount rate 41.7% 41.4% 45.3% 34.1%
P0 headcount 12 697 247 13 114 982 15 687 471 12 403 318
P1 0.1858 0.1885 0.2045 0.1375
P2 0.1095 0.1130 0.1189 0.0745
P0 headcount rate 19.2% 16.4% 14.6% 15.2%
P0 headcount 648 524 572 815 547 874 598 543
P1 0.0743 0.0553 0.0522 0.0552
P2 0.0404 0.0267 0.0269 0.0292
P0 headcount rate 4.5% 2.7% 3.3% 3.0%
P0 headcount 45 814 27 778 36 256 33 939
P1 0.0188 0.0083 0.0117 0.0111
P2 0.0123 0.0044 0.0064 0.0064
P0 headcount rate 1.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%
P0 headcount 48 907 14 479 19 151 31 302
P1 0.0072 0.0013 0.0015 0.0038






1995 and 2000, in line with the findings of Leibbrandt et al. (2006).  By 2004 the incidence of poverty in 
South Africa had fallen substantially, with a reduction of eight percentage points – equivalent to three 
million people – in the number falling below the poverty line.  Similar trends prevail in the depth and 
severity  of  poverty, which both showed a  marked decline  after  2000.   While population  growth can 
sometimes offset reductions made in the headcount rate (through keeping the headcount number high), it 
is encouraging to see that despite population growth, the number of people living in poverty in 2004 is 
slightly lower than the comparator for the pre-transition year of 1993.  Observe that the overall trend is 
driven by trends in the black population, for which poverty showed the greatest improvement after 2000.  
This is particularly positive given that the black population group is not only the largest but also the least 
affluent.  Poverty amongst coloureds and Indians appears to have been largely stable over the period, 
while white poverty appears to have increased slightly after 2000, although the numbers remain very small.   
 
To place estimates of the incidence of poverty in South Africa in context, national accounts-scaled AMPS 
estimates are contrasted with raw AMPS estimates and IES figures, both using raw IES data and IES data 
that has been scaled in line with the national accounts.  The IES estimates are taken from Van der Berg 
and Louw (2004).    
 
IES-based figures aside, the story told by these figures appears to be largely the same, regardless of which 
set of estimates is preferred.  While the levels of poverty vary widely depending on which data source is 
used, the trend changes little.  During the second half of the 1990s, poverty stabilised or rose slightly, with 
an improvement visible later in the period under study.  Interestingly, the adjusted AMPS figures reflect 
that poverty continued to rise until as recently as 2002.  From this year onwards it declined rapidly until 
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AMPS - Unadjusted AMPS - Adjusted
IES Income - Unadjusted IES Income - Adjusted21 
2004.  The fall in poverty implied by raw AMPS data was visibly more gradual although it began earlier, in 
2001.  Observe how far out of line the trend implied by the raw IES estimates is, contrasted with the 
patterns implied by estimates of poverty derived from the other data sources.  It is clear that at least in the 
case of the IES datasets for 1995 and 2000, national accounts scaling yields some benefits for poverty 
trend analysis through making measures based on the two surveys more comparable. 
 
If poverty has declined, has this had positive implications for the notoriously high income inequality level 
in South Africa?  Table 3 below presents a range of inequality indicators for selected years for South 
Africa, including the commonly used Gini coefficient, which is most sensitive to changes in the middle of 
the income distribution (Hoogeveen & Özler 2004: 12).  The Theil-T and Theil-L indices belong to the 
class of general entropy inequality measures, which are functions of a parameter α.  The lower α is, the 
more sensitive the index is to income changes at the lower end of the distribution.  Setting α equal to zero 
yields the Theil-L index (also known as the mean logarithmic deviation), a particularly useful measure if an 
increase in inequality owing to falling incomes amongst the poor is viewed as the most harmful kind.  
Setting α equal to one yields the more common Theil-T, which weights sub-groups by income share; the 
Theil-L weights sub-groups by population share.  An advantage of the general entropy inequality measures 
is that they allow for the decomposition of aggregate inequality into between-group and within-group 
components, allowing one to determine the influence of changing racial inequality.  As in the case of 
poverty, inequality measures for each year from 1993 to 2004 are presented in the appendix.  
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It seems that the improvement in the incomes of the poor since 1994 has not kept track with the increases 
in affluence experienced by individuals higher up in the income distribution.  All measures indicate that 
inequality  increased substantially  between 1995  and 2000,  moderating  after  that, probably due to the 
recent expansion in social grant payments.  The massive increase in the Theil-T measure calculated for 
blacks  between  1995  and  2000  suggests  that  the  rise  in  aggregate  inequality  over  this  period  was 
predominantly due to improvement in conditions at the upper end of the income distribution.  While 
black  inequality  levels  stabilised  and  dropped  slightly  after  2000,  white  inequality  continued  to  rise, 
although off a much lower base.  However, levels of inequality within the black population remain the 
highest amongst all race groups.  Estimates of the Theil-T indicate that within-race inequality appears to 
have risen rapidly in relative importance as a component of aggregate inequality after the turn of the 
century; the Theil-L reflects a similar pattern although starting earlier and showing a more modest increase 
in  the  relative  importance  of  within-race  inequality.    This  is  a  continuation  of  a  longer  term  trend, 
although it appears to have gained further momentum recently.  In fact, within-race inequality has now 
finally overtaken the extreme levels of between-race inequality engineered by apartheid policy as the main 
1993 1995 2000 2004
Blacks 0.547 0.568 0.609 0.598
Coloureds 0.529 0.507 0.537 0.550
Indians 0.465 0.473 0.500 0.542
Whites 0.443 0.438 0.467 0.500
Total 0.678 0.677 0.716 0.700
1993 1995 2000 2004
Blacks 0.584 0.631 0.764 0.740
Coloureds 0.505 0.459 0.525 0.562
Indians 0.374 0.420 0.479 0.608
Whites 0.341 0.334 0.385 0.479
Total 0.938 0.929 1.081 1.066
Within-Race 0.440 0.457 0.530 0.594
Between-Race 0.498 0.472 0.550 0.471
Contribution of within-race 
component to the total 47% 49% 49% 56%
1993 1995 2000 2004
Blacks 0.559 0.616 0.695 0.666
Coloureds 0.527 0.475 0.545 0.584
Indians 0.421 0.404 0.462 0.552
Whites 0.386 0.345 0.398 0.469
Total 0.935 0.979 1.083 1.000
Within-race 0.530 0.549 0.642 0.635
Between-race 0.405 0.430 0.441 0.366
Contribution of within-race 
component to the total 57% 56% 59% 63%
Table 3: Income inequality measures, 1993-2004
Gini coefficient
Theil-L index / Mean logarithmic deviation
Theil-T index23 
driver of income inequality in South Africa.   
 
6. SENSITIVITY TESTING 
 
As  analysis  of  poverty  trends  is  the  main focus  of this  paper,  robustness  testing  is  concentrated  on 
determining the robustness of these.  Two major issues affecting the robustness of conclusions are the 
choice of poverty line and the application of the national accounts adjustment methodology.  These are 
dealt with separately below. 
 
Stochastic dominance testing involves plotting cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) to determine the 
sensitivity of a number of income distributions (spread across time or space) to the choice of poverty line.  
Figure 6 below contains CDFs reflecting national accounts-scaled AMPS income distributions for 1995, 
2000 and 2004.  While there is visibly less poverty in 2004 than in either 1995 or 2000 regardless of the 
level at which the poverty line is set, there is no strict poverty dominance for the two earlier years.  The 
CDFs intersect near the bottom of the distribution, with the 1995 CDF lying slightly above the 2000 CDF 
over a range associated with extreme poverty.  This suggests that severe deprivation may have been less 
widespread in 2000 than 1995.  However, this result is reversed for higher, more commonly used poverty 
lines.  Consequently, the argument that poverty increased between 1995 and 2000 before falling to below 
1995 levels by 2004 is convincingly supported by the data.   
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Secondly, the impact of scaling the data to be consistent with national accounts data is considered.  For 
this purpose, kernel densities are estimated on both the adjusted and raw AMPS datasets for 1995 and 
2004.  Figure 7 below captures the results.  Since the selected poverty line lies just to the right of the mode 
of  the income distribution  before  adjustment,  a  small rightward shift of the income distribution  has 
obviously important consequences for the size of the population classified as poor.  Nonetheless, both the 
raw and adjusted AMPS distributions show improvements with respect to poverty between 1995 and 
2004.  Further, the shape of each distribution remains largely unchanged with scaling, apart from a slight 
flattening of the distribution at the mode and smoothing of the bump located towards the upper end of 
the income distribution.  The practical consequence of the change in the shape of the distribution is 
slightly increased income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) in the adjusted distribution 
compared with the raw distribution.  Interested readers are referred to Van der Berg et al. (2007) for a full 
set of comparable poverty and inequality measures estimated using the raw AMPS datasets. 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The poverty estimates arrived at in this paper have a number of virtues compared with the official data 
presently available on poverty, based on the Income and Expenditure Surveys of 1995 and 2000.  Firstly, 
the estimates presented here are more recent, allowing policymakers to venture beyond 2000 in evaluating 
the effect of policy.  Secondly, they are consistent with the national accounts, whereas the official data 
sources (the two IESs) are clearly at odds with the national accounts - another official data source).  
Thirdly, as the estimates draw on a large range of official data sources, they are also consistent with most 
other official sources, including the remuneration data from the OHS and LFS.  Finally, the estimates 
offer the added benefit, of great importance for time series econometric work, of being available on an 
annual basis. 
 
The  results obtained in  this  paper  point to  a decline  in poverty  after the turn of the  century.  It  is 
illuminating that this is broadly in line with the AMPS data itself, although AMPS is only used to obtain 
the  intra-race  distribution  estimates  applied  to  the  national  accounts  based  mean  incomes  by  race.  
Moreover, these results intuitively make sense, given the expansion of the social grant system in this 
period.  There is growing evidence to support at least these broad conclusions about poverty decline.  This 
comes from inter alia the latest wave of the Kwazulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) and the 
General Household Surveys (GHS) for 2002-2005; the former shows a decline in money-metric poverty 26 
while the latter reports a decline in people reporting going hungry.  Critics of an earlier version of this 
paper now acknowledge that the broad conclusions are probably correct (Seekings 2006; Meth 2006).  
 
Two criticisms to our results remain: one is methodological, the second argues that using the national 
accounts adjustment lowers poverty estimates.  Regarding the first, no final word can be spoken.  The 
paper has provided ample evidence that there is no simple and universally accepted answer as to how to 
deal with conflicts between survey and national accounts data.  Also, it has been mentioned that an 
adjustment of survey data to make it national accounts consistent - as used in this paper - was common in 
India for a long time, has been the basis for much work by prominent authors on estimates of global 
poverty, is the norm in Latin America, and is also favoured by many others.  Further, it is shown that 
South African national accounts data are more consistent than the two post-transition IESs with other 
evidence about the course of the South African economy between 1995 and 2000. 
 
The lower poverty estimates obtained when making adjustment of survey data to national accounts data 
are not seen as a real problem.  Poverty lines are at the best of times subjective; in South Africa there has 
hitherto been no commonly accepted poverty line.  If one believes that these estimates understate poverty, 
then the appropriate response is to use a higher poverty line for intertemporal and other comparisons.   27 
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Table A1: Poverty trends, 1993-2004
Group FGT 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P0 headcount rate 33.63% 32.06% 33.19% 33.98% 33.84% 33.88% 35.01% 36.43% 36.62% 37.42% 32.02% 28.11%
P0 headcount 13 426 144 13 034 375 13 724 926 14 279 932 14 434 285 14 690 561 15 417 686 16 287 231 16 544 280 17 072 199 14 749 008 13 063 241
P1 0.1491 0.1358 0.1493 0.1488 0.1489 0.1463 0.1499 0.1631 0.1661 0.1723 0.1359 0.1128
P2 0.0879 0.0776 0.0889 0.0864 0.0858 0.0833 0.0847 0.0946 0.0980 0.1023 0.0771 0.0612
P0 headcount rate 41.73% 40.01% 41.42% 42.77% 42.34% 42.63% 43.66% 45.33% 45.05% 45.78% 39.08% 34.13%
P0 headcount 12 697 247 12 428 049 13 114 982 13 791 263 13 885 831 14 244 148 14 851 424 15 687 471 15 805 714 16 266 731 14 050 372 12 403 318
P1 0.1858 0.1699 0.1885 0.1886 0.1877 0.1856 0.1883 0.2045 0.2054 0.2128 0.1662 0.1375
P2 0.1095 0.0970 0.1130 0.1097 0.1084 0.1060 0.1067 0.1189 0.1213 0.1270 0.0942 0.0745
P0 headcount rate 19.17% 15.73% 16.41% 12.53% 13.53% 10.78% 14.06% 14.57% 17.63% 19.21% 16.15% 15.22%
P0 headcount 648 524 540 672 572 815 444 477 487 510 394 007 521 322 547 874 671 057 739 909 628 945 598 543
P1 0.0743 0.0589 0.0553 0.0437 0.0446 0.0350 0.0490 0.0522 0.0685 0.0703 0.0631 0.0552
P2 0.0404 0.0321 0.0267 0.0223 0.0213 0.0167 0.0249 0.0269 0.0374 0.0358 0.0354 0.0292
P0 headcount rate 4.51% 3.41% 2.66% 3.05% 3.18% 3.42% 3.12% 3.29% 3.49% 3.57% 3.12% 2.98%
P0 headcount 45 814 35 093 27 778 32 171 33 959 36 920 34 015 36 256 38 767 40 020 35 229 33 939
P1 0.0188 0.0122 0.0083 0.0111 0.0125 0.0102 0.0087 0.0117 0.0130 0.0127 0.0110 0.0111
P2 0.0123 0.0075 0.0044 0.0070 0.0080 0.0047 0.0040 0.0064 0.0072 0.0069 0.0058 0.0064
P0 headcount rate 0.96% 0.83% 0.28% 0.33% 0.71% 0.35% 0.27% 0.37% 0.71% 0.56% 0.80% 0.62%
P0 headcount 48 907 42 305 14 479 17 073 36 962 18 381 13 992 19 151 36 746 28 854 40 469 31 302
P1 0.0072 0.0060 0.0013 0.0014 0.0050 0.0014 0.0012 0.0015 0.0051 0.0026 0.0047 0.0038











1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Blacks 0.547 0.544 0.568 0.564 0.573 0.577 0.585 0.609 0.611 0.607 0.605 0.598
Coloureds 0.529 0.506 0.507 0.516 0.516 0.509 0.523 0.537 0.551 0.556 0.551 0.550
Indians 0.465 0.444 0.473 0.462 0.479 0.480 0.506 0.500 0.511 0.508 0.542 0.542
Whites 0.443 0.445 0.438 0.442 0.444 0.453 0.452 0.467 0.467 0.480 0.518 0.500
Total 0.678 0.670 0.677 0.691 0.690 0.689 0.701 0.716 0.715 0.724 0.709 0.700
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Blacks 0.584 0.571 0.631 0.640 0.648 0.660 0.687 0.764 0.755 0.758 0.775 0.740
Coloureds 0.505 0.464 0.459 0.470 0.485 0.471 0.495 0.525 0.558 0.580 0.564 0.562
Indians 0.374 0.338 0.420 0.382 0.411 0.410 0.485 0.479 0.490 0.498 0.610 0.608
Whites 0.341 0.348 0.334 0.337 0.347 0.361 0.355 0.385 0.380 0.439 0.530 0.479
Total 0.938 0.916 0.929 0.978 0.977 0.976 1.018 1.081 1.071 1.143 1.121 1.066
Within-Race 0.440 0.437 0.457 0.453 0.467 0.479 0.488 0.530 0.531 0.561 0.630 0.594
Between-Race 0.498 0.479 0.472 0.525 0.511 0.497 0.530 0.550 0.540 0.582 0.491 0.471
Contribution of within-race 
component to the total 47% 48% 49% 46% 48% 49% 48% 49% 50% 49% 56% 56%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Blacks 0.559 0.547 0.616 0.591 0.611 0.619 0.633 0.695 0.709 0.703 0.688 0.666
Coloureds 0.527 0.479 0.475 0.497 0.491 0.476 0.513 0.545 0.594 0.588 0.599 0.584
Indians 0.421 0.375 0.404 0.400 0.435 0.425 0.466 0.462 0.488 0.488 0.546 0.552
Whites 0.386 0.382 0.345 0.356 0.378 0.372 0.370 0.398 0.415 0.426 0.505 0.469
Total 0.935 0.902 0.979 0.982 0.976 0.976 1.013 1.083 1.090 1.118 1.042 1.000
Within-race 0.530 0.516 0.549 0.568 0.573 0.573 0.587 0.642 0.660 0.657 0.657 0.635
Between-race 0.405 0.386 0.430 0.414 0.403 0.403 0.425 0.441 0.430 0.461 0.385 0.366
Contribution of within-race 
component to the total 57% 57% 56% 58% 59% 59% 58% 59% 61% 59% 63% 63%
Table A2: Income inequality measures, 1993-2004
Gini coefficient
Theil-L index / Mean logarithmic deviation
Theil-T index